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ABSTRACT
Privacy preservation is a big concern for various sectors. To pro-
tect individual user data, one emerging technology is differential
privacy. However, it still has limitations for datasets with frequent
queries, such as the fast accumulation of privacy cost. To tackle this
limitation, this paper explores the integration of a secured decen-
tralised ledger, blockchain. Blockchain will be able to keep track of
all noisy responses generated with differential privacy algorithm
and allow for certain queries to reuse old responses. In this paper, a
demo of a proposed blockchain-based privacy management system
is designed as an interactive decentralised web application (DApp).
The demo created illustrates that leveraging on blockchain will
allow the total privacy cost accumulated to decrease significantly.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In today’s digital age, Internet has given us the potential to col-
lect and access various kinds of information easily. Individuals are
willing to give away personal information for online convenience
[1]. This vast amount of data about individuals is being constantly
stored in various databases. When analysed efficiently, data can
translate into meaningful information about the individual’s be-
haviour. This leads to personal data being the new currency of the
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digital age and is sought after by every industry and government.
Despite the massive benefits that data analysis can bring, improper
handling of sensitive data usually leads to more information being
revealed than intended. One attempt to preserve user privacy was
to release anonymised or aggregated data. However, it is proven
that records can be de-anonymised when combined with other data
sources. This happens when attackers can accurately match the
anonymised database to another non-anonymised database [6].
The introduction of differential privacy has brought us closer
to achieving the goal of preserving personal privacy while still
revealing meaningful information about datasets. The brief idea
behind differential privacy is to incorporate some noise to the result
of an output such that it does not change significantly with or
without the addition of a single input in the dataset.
(ϵ,δ )-Differential Privacy [3] is defined as:
Definition 1. A randomized algorithmY satisfies (ϵ,δ )-Differential
Privacy if, for any two neighboring datasets differing by one record
(D and D
′
) and all subsets S of the output range, it generates a ran-
domized output such that: Pr [Y (D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵPr [Y (D′) ∈ S] + δ ,
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the randomized
algorithm Y .
Traditionally, every query processed with differential privacy
will generate a privacy cost. This privacy cost accumulates even if
it is the same query. It brings about an issue where the privacy cost
may exceed the privacy budget, leading to a greater percentage of
privacy leakage [2, 4].
The rise of blockchain technology gives rise to a possible solu-
tion to the above problem of privacy budget exhaustion. By using
blockchain’s key advantages of decentralisation, tamper-proofing
and traceability, it provides a distributed, trusted platform of peer-
to-peer network to store information regarding the queries pro-
cessed with differential privacy [7]. These transaction data can then
be retrieved later to be processed for possible reuse of previously
generated noisy answer. This reusing of old noisy answer will be
highlighted in the subsequent web DApp demonstration. With the
proposed blockchain-based privacy management system, the total
privacy cost incurred will be significantly reduced, catering for
datasets with frequent queries such as medical record datasets.
2 RELATEDWORKS
Zyskind et al. [9] tackle the issue about privacy when using third-
party mobile platform by suggesting the combination of blockchain
with off-blockchain storage to create a personal data management
platform for increased privacy. This allows users to have owner-
ship and control over their data without requiring to trust any
third-party. Kosba et al. [5] proposes a framework for building
privacy-preserving smart contract. The proposed framework, Hawk,
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allows any programmer to easily write a program that implements
a cryptographic protocol between blockchain and the user. This
cryptographic protocol includes using authenticated data structures
and zero-knowledge proofs for added security.
The above studies among others focused on identity privacy
between the blockchain and the users, while trusting the anonymity
of the blockchain. However, there is a lack of literature which
focuses not only on the privacy of blockchain, but also the privacy
protection for the database itself. Research on reusing noisy answers
for privacy protection has also been done previously.
Xiao et al. [8] proposed a differentially private algorithm that cor-
relates Laplace noise added to different query results for improved
data utility. However, in this paper, Gaussian noise is used over
Laplace noise for an easier privacy analysis of multiple query types.
The sum of independent Laplace random variables does not follow
a Laplace distribution. On the other hand, the sum of independent
Gaussian random variables still follows the Gaussian distribution.
As such, using Gaussian noise will allow the algorithm to handle
queries of different types.
3 DEMO OVERVIEW
To illustrate the proposed blockchain-based privacy management
system, a decentralised web application is created. This demo sim-
ulates how the system implements differential privacy algorithm
while tracking and reducing the privacy cost incurred. Fig. 1 shows
the overall user interface of the blockchain-based demo.
Figure 1: Screenshot of blockchain-based privacy
management system demo.
3.1 Ethereum account information
Figure 2: Displaying Ethereum account information of user.
Ethereum account information of the user is displayed on a bar
fixed at the top of the page once the user granted permission to the
demo. The demo gets the account information (wallet address and
balance inside it) from MetaMask extension of the browser. When
connecting with MetaMask, a pop-up that is managed by MetaMask
will appear asking users for their permission to access the account.
Account information will only be displayed after permission is
granted.
Figure 3: Capturing user’s desired differential privacy
parameters.
3.2 Defining differential privacy parameters
In the demo, users will be able to specify parameters used for dif-
ferential privacy algorithm (ϵ and δ ) using the input bar shown in
Fig. 3. ϵ value is used to determine how strict the level of privacy
is. The smaller the ϵ value, the better the privacy preservation. δ
defines the level of relaxation of the ϵ-differential privacy notion.
3.3 Queries selection
Figure 4: Types of queries supported.
Users can select the query type that they wish to inquire about
by pressing on the buttons created. In the backend, each button is
linked to a sensitivity level that is pre-calculated and assigned to the
button according to its query type. Differential privacy algorithm
scales the noise generated with the sensitivity of the query function.
This sensitivity level is the maximum distance between the true
query results for any two neighboring datasets that differ by one
record. The calculation of the sensitivity level follows:
∆Q =maxneiдhbor inдD,D
′ ∥Q(D) −Q(D′)∥2,
where ∆Q is the sensitivity level of the query Q, and D and D′ are
neighboring datasets that differs by one record.
3.4 Reuse of previous Gaussian noise
The algorithm is designed to run on the comparison of standard
deviation and follows the general workflow in Fig. 5.
Based on the privacy parameters from the user, a σ value will be
calculated. This is the standard deviation of the noise required for
this query. To answer query Qm with a sensitivity of ∆Qm , a zero-
mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ =
√
2ln 1.25δm ×
∆Qm
ϵm
is added to the true query result. Since Gaussian noise can be calcu-
lated from the standard deviation, the proposed system stores the
standard deviation and uses it as a basis of comparison for reusing
noise. The system retrieves all previous transactions from the
blockchain and perform comparison. It first checks the blockchain
for any existing record with the same query type and standard
deviation used. If an existing record is found in the blockchain, the
algorithm will return the same result as the output of differential
privacy. If no existing record is found, it will compare the stan-
dard deviation of a new query with previous queries made. The
algorithm reuses Gaussian noise by injecting noise to the previous
noise to generate a new noise that fulfils the privacy requirements.
As such, full reuse will be possible if the new standard deviation is
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Figure 5: Workflow of noise reuse.
larger than the minimum standard deviation of all previous queries
from the same type. The algorithmwill then calculate the new noise
that needs to be added to the previous results and derive the new
result. If the new standard deviation is smaller than the minimum
standard deviation previously generated, it will not be able to fully
reuse any previous noise. The algorithm can only reuse a fraction
of a previous noise and computes additional noise to be added. The
query will then be forwarded to the server to add the computed
noise to the partially reused noisy response.
3.5 Output display
Figure 6: Displaying of output with ϵ privacy cost.
This demo displays the output of any query performed in a card
format that is shown in Fig. 6. These cards will pop up once the
output is available. The header of the card contains a query ID that
is generated for the query submitted. In the body, it contains the
query type that was requested, the noisy response generated by
the application, standard deviation (σ ) calculated, blockchain price,
privacy cost, and the remaining privacy budget. The privacy cost
displayed is ϵ privacy cost.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed system is developed by making use of Bootstrap,
Ethereum, MetaMask, Web3.js, Truffle Suite, Provable, MongoDB
and Heroku. Fig. 7 shows the architectural diagram of the proposed
system.
Figure 7: Overall software architecture.
The DApp consists of the frontend client browser and the back-
end that runs on a decentralised platform, Ethereum and MongoDB
database at the hosted server. Truffle Suite and Provable is used
for the development of the smart contract. For the frontend client
browser, index.html and app.css files define the webpage displays
for the user. It also makes use of Bootstrap for responsive inter-
actions with the user. The frontend also contains a app.js file that
maps items from index.html, interacts with Web3.js, processes cal-
culations and parses it to the blockchain.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a simple DApp demo is developed to illustrate the
use of blockchain to reuse previously generated noisy responses
from differential privacy algorithm. In the future, this demo can be
improved with the addition of graphical elements to better show
the effects of the system such as the increase in number of queries
that user can submit without exceeding the privacy budget. The
demo can also be further improved by analyzing and quantifying
the extent of privacy preservation with the reuse of noise.
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